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Abstract 
For decades the bureaucratic and legislative power of the European Commission has interested 
scholars of EU studies. Yet, relatively little data are known about the exact division of power of 
the European Commission in legislative affairs apart from case studies (Cini, 2000; Schmidt, 
2000). This paper presents analyses of qualitative and quantitative data to analyse how powerful 
some experts consider the Commission to be and to see how influential it actually is. Based on 
recently collected expert interviews I show that senior EU officials rate the Commission highly 
against other EU institutions and the member states. I contrast these results with the actual 
influence of the Commission on the legislative process. Using the data set “Decision Making in 
the European Union” (Thomson, Stokman, König, & Achen, 2005), which contains data on 
positions of EU member states and institutions in 60 legislative acts, I show the direct influence 
which the Commission exerts with its agenda setting and bureaucratic power. Multivariate 
analyses of 150 negotiation issues between the member states, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission demonstrate that the influence of the European Commission is overrated 
because it cannot defend its original proposal as much as intended. The more the Commission 
takes EU members positions into account, the more success it has in the EU negotiations. Thus, 
it functions rather as agent dependent on member states than as supranational entrepreneur.  
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Introduction 
When the European Council and European Parliament adopted a very business-friendly directive 
on e-commerce trade in the European internal market in 2000, they had accepted the original 
proposal of the European Commission nearly in its original content
1. This proposal protected e-
commerce businesses from lawsuits by ensuring that the country of origin principle prevailed 
which meant that the private law of the country of the provider and not the customer is applied. 
The regulation guarantees that internet traders do not have to adapt to 15 different private laws 
but that they have only to apply the law of their country of origin. During the discussion of this 
directive which was subject to the codecision procedure, the Commission could not only defend 
the main idea of its original proposal against more consumer protectionist member states such as 
Denmark and Germany, but it could also convince the European Parliament not to force the 
Council into the conciliation committee but to accept the proposal after the second reading. 
Quite contrary to this success story is the discussion about the new services directive currently 
conducted in Brussels. The liberal directive initiated by the former Commissioner Bolkestein is 
intended to remove legal obstacles to service providers who want to offer their services abroad. 
The same idea - “the country of origin principle” – faces now fierce opposition by France and 
Germany which want to protect their national markets. The new Commissioner for Internal 
Market has already backed down and announced, that he will reformulate the proposal realising 
that the current one “will not fly”
2.  
The two accounts illustrate two opinions about the influence of the Commission. In the 
first case the Commission is said to have used its right of initiative and thus shaped EU 
legislation significantly.  Other success stories report the skilful manipulation of member states’ 
preferences by the Commission before a law was initiated in order to ensure the passing of a law 
according to the wishes of the Commission (Schmidt, 2000). By its sole right to initiative the 
Commission enjoys a substantial amount of influence on European legislation – a commonly 
accepted fact which is yet not fully explored. The second case illustrates distinctly that the 
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Commission is dependent on the member states’ preferences and has to take them into account 
in order to realise its policy ideas.  
If the Commission is successful, it is not clear why this is the case. One of the reasons 
could be that the Commission uses its advantage of information and expertise to propose 
initiatives which can only partly be altered by the EU member states and the European 
Parliament in the course of the legislative discussions. In these cases, we would expect differences 
of success between the various directorate-generals according to their expertise. Yet, it could also 
be that the Commission suggests only proposals which are either requested by the member 
states
3 and the EP
4 or have already taken possible resistance into account. The following article 
wants to highlight this assumed power of the European Commission and analyses in which cases 
the Commission is most successful and what the reasons for a success or failure are. I will discuss 
how powerful experts from the EU institutions consider the European Commission to be. With 
the help of the “Decision Making in the European Union” (DEU) data set, I investigate whether 
the Commission is actually as successful as commonly assumed. 
This article presents in its first theoretical part the current state of literature about the 
influence of the European Commission on European legislation. I draw my hypotheses about the 
power of the Commission from these considerations and illustrate the opinions about the 
Commission with expert interviews from a data set about the “Power, Skill and Information” 
(PSI) of the EU actors which I gathered in 2000-2002. I will analyse how successful the 
Commission actually is by analysing these hypotheses with the data set from the research project 
“Decision Making in the European Union” (DEU) which encompasses data on 60 legislative 
proposals of the last five years. In a last part, I discuss the results and suggest further ideas for 
analysis in order to shed more light on the most important bureaucracy in the European Union.  
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Theoretical Background  
The European Commission plays a dominant role in the legislation of the European Union by 
having the right of initiative and thus determining the agenda of the EU
5. The Commission 
received the right of initiative from the member states who delegated this task to this unique 
supranational form of bureaucracy. Several authors such as Kassim and Menon (2003) or Pollack 
(1997) discuss the delegation relationship between the principals – the EU member states- and its 
agent – the European Commission and analyse how obedient this agent fulfils its original task. 
By initiating legislation the Commission influences content and timing of legislative 
proposals. Although the Council and the Parliament may assume part of this right of initiative by 
asking the Commission to propose something specific, the Commission is not forced to follow 
these suggestions. It is up to the Commission whether to take up these ideas or not, but it 
generally has the reputation of being very receptive for ideas. This is not surprising because the 
Commission also has an interest of appearing successful and thus wants to propose laws which 
have a chance of being passed successfully. I am not aware of a situation in which the 
Commission did not respond to a demand of the Council or the EP and has been sued because 
of non-compliance.  
I assume that the European Commission as rational actor already anticipates possible 
resistance of the member states and the EP. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997:186-88) quote an 
example in which the Commission sent a communication instead of a fully-fledged proposal to 
the member states in order to test the opinions of the member states and to avoid proposals 
which would not find a majority in the Council. Schmidt (2000) illustrates the work of the 
Commission before it initiates a proposal by pointing out an example where the Commission 
skilfully manipulated the preferences of some member states in order to gain a necessary majority 
to support its proposal. Thus it can choose the winning position closest to its own preference.  
In a later study, however, Schmidt (2001) demonstrates how the presidency of the 
Council can assume parts of the right of initiative of the Commission and thus assume power 
from the Commission. But the literature on the relationship between Council and Commission 
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also stresses the fact that different presidencies may support the success of a Commission 
proposal. Some skilful Commission officials are said to predict which presidency treats their 
proposal favourably so that they schedule their proposals accordingly. An example for such 
behaviour is the telecommunication directive which profited greatly from the Italian, Dutch and 
Belgium presidency (Fouilleux, De Maillard, & Smith, 2001) 
The right of initiative of the Commission is even further strengthened by the fact that a 
proposal by the Commission can only be altered by a unanimous decision of the Council of 
Ministers (Schmidt, 2001:126). Using several case studies Schmidt illustrates how the 
Commission accepts even proposals which were strongly altered by the respective Council 
presidencies in order to achieve at least a result and to avoid the failure of the law. The strong 
norm of consensus in the Council
6 weakens the Commission because it cannot seek strategic 
alliances with the member states closest to the Commission. With this finding she supports her 
claim to increasingly implement informal norms such as the consensus rule instead of only 
looking at the formal agenda setting right of the Commission. Hug (2001) criticizes this idea by 
pointing out that this would come close to ad-hoc assumptions. In his opinion, the lack of 
agenda influence of the Commission in these cases could also be due to the ignorance of member 
states’ preferences. This informational asymmetry could explain why the Commission did not 
find enough coalition partners among the EU governments and could not play out its agenda 
setting power fully. I wonder whether this is actually probable, because the Commission has 
usually a substantial amount of experience in its cooperation with the member states so that their 
preferences should not come as a surprise to them.  
It is unknown to which extent the original proposals of the Commission get changed by 
Council and EP. Cini (2000) estimates that up to 80% of the original proposal remain unchanged 
but this seems to be rather an informed guess than an empirically proven fact. The Commission 
does not only enjoy the agendasetting power, it can also withdraw a proposal if it has the 
impression that the idea of original proposal has been seriously distorted. This happened in 1986, 
when the Commission withdrew its suggestion about the student exchange programme 
ERASMUS because the member states had changed its content too much (Spence, 1995). This 
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possibility of withdrawal bears a convenient threat potential for the Commissioners. In one 
incident Commissioner Bolkestein threatened to withdraw the law on a common customs tariff 
when he got the impression that the member states were not sufficiently prepared to protect the 
systems against fraud. The threat showed its desired effect so that the member states complied 
and adopted the law with a better protection against fraud
7. 
Hug (Hug, 2003) doubts whether the commonly accepted integrationist preferences of 
the Commission are as supranational as often claimed. Very often, the Commission is expected 
to be a preference outlier (Garrett & Tsebelis, 1996; Tsebelis, 1994) but Hug correctly points out 
that there is little empirical data supporting that view.  In view of the fact that the Commission is 
the agent of the member states and to some extent dependent on them regarding future 
freedoms and discretion, it is quite logical to assume that the Commission’s preferences are not 
exogenously given but explicable by the preferences of the member states and thus exogenous. 
Thus, the preferences of the Commission should relate closely to the preferences of their 
principals (Hug, 2003:55). In his analysis of the position of the Commission in relation to the 
member states, Hug demonstrates that the Commission position is not as distant or supranational 
as it is often assumed (Hug, 2003:59 ) and not at odds with the member states’ preferences. 
Therefore, it would not be surprising if the Commission is not as supranational as often 
expected.  
A more subtle form of power of the Commission is based on the fact that the 
Commission is present during all Council negotiations. Although the Commission does not vote, 
it is sometimes called the “16
th member state” (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1997) because of its 
participation in the negotiations about laws in the first pillar. Its presence gives Commission 
officials the chance to explain its original intention, to comment possible desires for changes and 
to change the proposal during the negotiations. But the Council does still enjoy the right to 
exclude the Commission from the negotiations.
8 
Furthermore, the amount of politicization of a proposal is a factor mentioned when 
judging the Commission’s power is the amount. When analysing the relationship between 
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Council and Commission, Pollack (1997) elaborates the level of contention of a political topic as 
factor which influences the power of the Commission. The more politicized a topic is, the 
smaller the influence of the Commission, because the member states have a stronger interest in 
realising their ideas and to demonstrate their capabilities. Much larger is the Commission when 
the EU governments consider a topic to be relatively uncontroversial and when the Commission 
can use its informational advantage fully (Pollack, 1997:123).  
Another form of influence of the European Commission apart from inititating proposals 
is its role in executing laws as agent of the member states. By delegating the execution of the laws 
to the Commission via the comitology system, the member states save costs and efficiency 
because an independent implementation office increases the credibility of a political measure 
(Franchino, 2002). The Commission implements the laws with the help of approximately 400 
committees, in which national and Commission officials work together in implementing EU laws. 
This cooperation offers a possibility to the member states to control the executive functions of 
the Commission in a form a continuous “police-patrol monitoring” (McCubbins & Schwartz, 
1984) and to ensure that the Commission does not extend its powers too much. The power of 
the Commission varies according to the type of committee. Depending on the question whether 
it is a consulting, administrative or regulative committee, the Commission has more or less 
influence during the implementation and the member states vote with unanimity or qualified 
majority in these committees. Thus, in some cases the choice of committee type is contested 
between the institutions as in the Eurodac decision. In this debate about a database of 
fingerprints of asylumseekers, the Commission threatened to take the Council to the European 
Court of Justice when the Council insisted against the treaty provisions on a type of 
implementation committee which foresaw unanimity and thus a veto right for each member 
state
9.  
This is quite a typical behaviour which Franchino (2004) illustrated distinctly in his 
analysis on EU comitology. He demonstrated that the member states delegate the 
implementation of laws to national institutions and not to the Commission when they had 
decided unanimously in the Council or when they concerned specialised topics needing a high 
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level of specialized and technical knowledge. Unanimity is an indicator that the member states are 
not yet prepared to transfer competence to the Commission’s level. If the Council votes with 
qualified majority system, it is a sign that the Council is prepared to share its competence with the 
Commission and to use its supranational management capabilities.  
All things considered, the influence of the Commission sinks in the course of a legislative 
negotiation. The Commission determines schedule and content of a legislative proposal. During 
the legislative discussions it turns into an actor of second or third order which participates but 
has no voice. 
The power of the Commission has also decreased due to the increased power of the 
European Parliament. Amongst representatives of formal models, a lively debate developed in 
the 90s to which extent the introduction of the codecision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty 
extended the powers of the EP.  
A first decline of power was experienced by the Commission after the introduction of the 
cooperation procedure in the European Single Act in1986. This new procedure gave the EP the 
chance to make amendments during the second reading of a law which had to be accepted after 
confirmation by the Commission by the Council with qualified majority voting or refused by 
unanimity. Since unanimity is more difficult to achieve than qualified majority, the EP assumes 
part of the agendasetting power of the Commission and can determine the content of a proposal 
to a certain extent. Therefore the EP turned into a “conditional agendasetter” ((Hubschmid & 
Moser, 1997; Tsebelis, 1994, 1996). The Commission’s power has thus been weakened, because it 
is dependent on the EP when it wants to make amendments after the Council has adopted its 
common position 
10 (Schmidt, 2001:127). 
Crombez (1996; 2000) considers this claim about the decreased power of the 
Commission as exaggerated, because the EP is still dependent on the Commission whether the 
Commission includes the EP’s amendments in the proposal or not. Only after the second 
reading, the EP sees a chance to have its opinion included (Moser, 1996). Steunenberg (1994) 
also considers the Commission as the relevant agendasetter in situations with complete 
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information. Tsebelis (1996) contradicts them by pointing out the empirical fact that already 
many EP amendments become accepted after the first reading. A graphical analysis of this 
discussion demonstrated only small differences in the predictional power of the different models 
on the power of the institutions in the cooperation procedure (König & Pöter, 2001).  
The increase of power of the EP after the introduction of the codecision procedure 
instilled an even more intensive debate. The codecision procedure introduced the veto right of 
the EP after the third reading and a conciliation committee after the second reading in case the 
Council and the EP do not agree 
11 (Crombez, 1996; Rittberger, 2000). Moser (2000) explained 
that this procedure meant a power increase for the EP in contrast to the Commission because the 
commission had to accept the amendments of the EP even if they were not according to their 
wishes. Furthermore, the Commission is more limited in tabling its proposals as it has to suggest 
laws which are more attractive than the status quo not only in the eyes of the Council but also in 
the eyes of the European Parliament (Crombez et al., 2000).  
Doubts about this increase of power of the EP were raised by pointing out that the EP 
very rarely makes a proposal fail therefore the pivot player of the Council and not the EP 
determines the outcome (Garrett & Tsebelis, 1996). Tsebelis (2000) even declares that the EP 
had even more power under the cooperation procedure than under the codecision procedure 
because it could at least set the agenda in the former. These statements were strongly challenged 
by Crombez (2000), Moser (2000), practitioners from the EP (Corbett, 2000) as well as the actual 
policy of the EP which wants to extend the codecision procedure to more legislative areas: these 
attempts contradict the claim that codecision is not beneficial for the EP
12. Several case studies 
about the codecision procedure also demonstrate the increased influence of the EP in codecision 
(Earnshaw & Judge, 1993; Judge, 1994). Steunenberg and Selck (2005) show that a model with 
the EP as agenda setter which motivates the Council to a certain law delivers the best predictions. 
In consequence, I follow that the power increase of the EP is not only demonstrated with case 
studies and anecdotes but also with theoretical and formal analyses.  
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Another change to the codecision procedure which meant a power loss to the 
Commission was introduced in the Treaty of Amsterdam 1994: In the original version of the 
codecision procedure the Council and the EP could vote whether to accept the new “common 
text” of the conciliation procedure or whether to return to the common position of the Council 
which the EP had formerly refused. Thus, the decision of both institutions was between more or 
less legislation. The procedure was changed in Amsterdam to the extent, that the Council and the 
EP can now decide after the conciliation procedure whether to accept the “common draft” of the 
conciliation procedure or whether to cause the law to fail. Thus, the two institutions choose 
between a compromise of the conciliation committee or the status quo, between legislation or no 
legislation. This means a weakening of the influence of the Commission (Crombez et al., 2000) 
because the chance increased that EP and Council return to the status quo and block a proposal 
completely. Especially because the EP is said to accept something rather than nothing, the 
probability was quite high that the EP would at least accept the “common position” of the 
Council under the original codecision procedure. This had meant for the Commission that it 
could at least realise a part of its proposal under the old codecision procedure and that the new 
codecision procedure decreased its influence on the legislation (Kasack, 2004).  
The abbreviated overview of the current research on the Commission illustrated that 
there are still research gaps concerning the influence of the Commission. It is not yet distinct to 
which extent the Commission is a preference outlier, which factors influence its success and very 
few studies measure these competing hypotheses on the influence of this supranational agent. In 
the following part, I will introduce the data with which I am going to measure the Commission’s 
power.  
The data 
To illustrate and test the hypotheses above I will use two data sets which were collected for the 
research project “Decision Making in the European Union”
 13. The first data set on estimates of 
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“Power, Skill and Information” (PSI) of EU institutions and member states was collected by 
Robert Thomas, Javier Arregui (both at that time Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) and me. By 
interviewing officials from Commission, Council and the EP we wanted to enquire whether long-
serving officials have a different opinion on the power of the institutions than formal analyses 
and political scientists. Our definition of power included not only formal powers but also 
informal power so that we asked our experts the following question:  
“Within the policy domain (specify domain) subject to (type of legislative procedure), the 
different stakeholders have different capabilities or amounts of potential to influence 
decision outcomes. This ability is based on a number of different resources: for example, 
the formal authority to take decisions, financial resources, information, access to other 
important stakeholders, leadership of a large number of people etc. Please indicate the 
capabilities of each stakeholder on a scale from 0 to 100.”  
In sum, we interviewed 21 experts; most of them were chosen because of their long-standing 
experience in the negotiations between the institutions
14. As the interviewees could give estimates 
for several policy domains and different legislative procedures, we gathered 36 estimates from the 
21 experts. After a careful consideration of the data we removed the respective statistical extreme 
values
15, leading to the power values for the institutions according to procedures as shown in the 
analysis section.  
I measure the success of the Commission using the data set “Decision Making in the 
European Union” (DEU). The DEU data set includes detailed information on 66 legislative 
proposals by the European Commission. In order to be considered for inclusion, a legislative 
project needed to raise at least a minimum level of controversy. The selection criterion was 
whether Agence Europe, a daily comprehensive news service reporting about European Union 
activities, mentioned a proposal and whether an EU expert confirmed that the proposal raised a 
minimum level of controversy. The temporal domain of the study is limited insofar as the 
Council had to discuss a proposal within the period from January 1999 to December 2000. The 
legislative proposals that were selected were either subject to the consultation or the co-decision 
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procedure; both procedures can require unanimity or qualified majority as voting threshold in the 
Council of Ministers. 
The DEU research team conducted expert interviews on the proposals between early 
2000 and early 2002. DEU researchers interviewed more than 150 experts; the average length of 
an interview session was 100 minutes. Interviews were only conducted with experts who had a 
chance to witness the whole bargaining process between and within the diverse legislative bodies 
of the EU. Experts were typically officials from the European Commission, the Council of 
Ministers or the Permanent Representations of the Member States in Brussels. The experts 
provided the interviewing Ph. D. students with detailed information based on their memory or 
notes. The first task in the interviews was that an expert identified the controversial issues within 
a proposal. Based on this, they had to indicate the position the decisive actors (member states, 
the Commission, and the European Parliament) held shortly before the common position was 
adopted in the Council. Our experts had to locate the two EU actors holding the two most 
extreme positions on the two end points 0 and 100 of our dimension to represent the 
stakeholders’ opinions on that issue. Intermediate positions taken up by the remaining EU actors 
represent less extreme positions or compromise solutions achieved in the negotiation. Especially 
in the cases where qualitative and not numerical issues were negotiated, we relied on our 
interviewees’ expertise to identify the political distances of the negotiating parties. The majority 
of issues (109 of 162) reflect a ranked ordering of policy positions, 33 of the issues are 
dichotomous where the EU actors only hold extreme positions, and in 20 cases the measurement 
is on a scale level indicating that all points on the dimension have a substantive meaning, e. g. 
financial transfers to a certain EU programme. We also asked for the position of the reference 
point which describes the point prevailing if the negotiators do not find an agreement, as well as 
the location of the final outcome. The final outcome and the predictions are also located on the 
preference scale. Other questions pertained to the salience attributed to the contested issues, 
which we defined as the importance actors attach to the negotiation issues. We used this measure 
of salience as operationalization of the time preference of an actor towards an issue. The time 
preference mirrors the evaluation of a negotiation situation which is related to the concept of 
salience used in bargaining models by Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994). The measure of 
salience includes the notion of urgency and relevance, and thus we consider it as an indirect 
indicator for the time preference of negotiators. Outcomes were predicted on the preference 
scale.  
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In order to measure the influence of the various directorates-general, I inserted additional 
information about the responsible DG. The Directorates-General were attributed to the 
proposals according to the Prelex Database (www.europa.eu.int/prelex), which indicates the 
primarily responsible DG for a legislative proposal. This method bears the problem that the 
naming system of the Commission and to some extent the structure of the Commission changed 
in September 1999 when the new Prodi Commission took up work and Romano Prodi 
announced that he did not intend to learn these numbers and support such a system for insiders 
(Nugent, 2001b). In some cases, the DGs were still named after the old number numeration 
system before the Prodi Commission, in these cases I changed them into the easier and current 
naming system which indicates the main policy domain of the DG.  In some cases this was not 
easily possible because also the structure of the DGs changed. The reform of the Commission in 
1999 also encompassed the creation of a new Health and Consumer Protection DG out of the 
previous DG XXIV (Consumer Policy and Consumer Health Protection) and some parts of 
other DGs such as Employment, Agriculture and Environment (Nugent, 2001b:138) and the 
creation of a new DG Enterprise comprising the former DG III (Industry) , XIII 
(Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation of Research) and DG XXIII 
(Enterprise Policy, Distributive Trades, Tourism and Cooperatives). If a completely new DG was 
created and if the proposal had been fully debated under the auspices of the “old DG”, I counted 
the DG as a separate case.  
Analysis  
The following tables portray the descriptive analyses of the numerical expert estimates about the 
power of the institutions and give a first image about the power of the Commission in contrast to 
the Council and the European Parliament. Quite extraordinary is the dominant position of the 
European Parliament in the codecision procedure and the emphasis of the Council in both 
procedures. The power of the Commission is nearly unchanged in both procedures thus not 
indicating a power loss for the Commission after the introduction of the codecision procedure.  
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Table 1. Power estimes for the institutions in the consultation procedure16. 
Actor  N  Mean  Standard Deviation  Standardised Value17 
Commission  15  91.33  16.5  93 
Council  16  98.06  4.19  100 
EP  16  27.15  17.76  28 
 
Table 2 Power estimes for the institutions in the consultation procedure18. 
Actor  N  Mean  Standard Deviation  Standardised Values 
Commission  17  84.66  22.58  95 
Council  17  89.25  15.55  100 
EP  17  77.53  21.06  87 
 
Interestingly, the experts did not distinguish their power estimates according to voting procedure 
(unanimity or qualified majority voting), obviously this question does not seem to influence the 
distribution of power between the institutions in their opinion. The security about the power of 
the Council seems to be most distinct, because the standard deviation is lowest. More insecure 
are the experts when it comes to the Commission and the Council.  
In both procedures, the Commission has received an amazingly high value of 93 and 95 
points in comparison with the Council. Considering that the Commission’s influence depends 
mostly on its agendasetting right and taking into account that it loses influence in the course of a 
legislative debate, even more so during the codecision procedure, the high values for the 
Commission amaze. I will look into more detail in the justifications of the experts why this is the 
case.  
During the interviews about the power of the EU institutions, my interview partners 
justified their usually high numerical estimates for the European Commission by especially 
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mentioning the right of initiative called by one expert “a key role” [4]
19. A typical comment 
outlining the traditional source of influence for the Commission was: “[the] Commission has an 
amazing amount of power since they give the orientation with their suggestions. Strangely 
enough, the member states do not seem to be able to make compromise suggestions so that they 
have to rely on the better suggestions of the COM.” [5]. In the opinion of a director within the 
Commission, the member states are generally interested in promoting the internal market, a 
general desire which gives relatively large leeway and thus influence to the European Commission 
[1]. He outlined this claim by stating: “When the Commission suggests a proposal on the 
liberalisation of European electricity market, it is highly improbable that there will be no 
liberalisation whatsoever, so that at least 50% of the intended objectives of the Commission will 
prevail” [1]. 
Several of my interview partners also pointed out the system that the Commission does 
not initiate proposals regardless of the opinions of the member states. The Commission also asks 
for the opinions of the EU governments before drafting proposals; thus the proposals already 
reflect opinions of the states and industry. Especially the pharmaceutical industry is said to have a 
great influence when it comes to proposing legislation. According to this long-standing expert 
within the Commission, 30% of COM proposals are an application of international treaties’ 
obligations, 20% are suggested by member states and economic actors, 15-20% are 
implementations and updates of already existing legislature or treaty obligations – such as 
agricultural prices, whereas only 5-10% are originally new legislative acts [1]. All in all, this 
specific expert estimated that around 90% of new proposals are already influenced by the 
member states. Another interview partner pointed out that the Commission is often forced by 
the member states in package deals to initiate a certain point of legislation: “At least in every 
Council session, there is one such point on the agenda.” [4]. Another expert working in the DG 
Agriculture in the European Commission also stressed the importance of the right of initiative 
and then suspected that the Commission is sometimes deliberately asking for more that it actually 
wants as in the case of the Agenda 2000 [2].  
                                                 
 
 
19 The numbers in brackets are identification numbers for the different interview partners who wanted to stay anonymous.  
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The expertise of the Commission is not always regarded as an advantage as one expert of 
the Commission pointed out. According to his view the Commission “partly unskilful since they 
demonstrate too much expert interest.” [3]. This indicates that national interests of the member 
states weigh heavier than pure expertise. However, an interview partner from the Council 
considered the expertise of the Commission as its main and most important asset [8].  
Matching the theoretical consideration about the shift of power after codecision, one of 
my interview partners also felt that the codecision shifted power away from the Commission:“ In 
the course of the co-decision procedure it becomes more a sort of honest broker, that is a sort of 
role change. Later on in the course of the co-decision procedure, the power shifts toward the 
Council and the EP, so that Council and EP have 75% of the power together, and the COM only 
25%.” [4].  
Several interviewees mentioned a recent power loss of the Commission. One interview 
partner stressed the fact that the power struggle between the Commission and the EP during the 
Santer Commission crisis in 1999 [4]. During this crisis of mismanagement the Commission lost 
credibility and has to “make more concessions today” [4]. One of his colleagues also described 
the development that the EP has gained power at the costs of the Commission for example 
during the BSE crisis as well as during the mismanagement crisis of the Commission [7]. 
The interview results illustrate distinctively how high the power of the Commission is 
considered to be. In the following descriptive analyses I will portray, whether the assumed power 
actually translates into success. Based on the data of the DEU data set, I calculated the success of 
the EU actors in the 60 legislative proposals contained in the data. I define the distance of an 
actor’s ideal position to the outcome defines negotiation success. I rescaled this measure so that a 
higher score indicates more success; this measure has been used before and is called value score 
(Hösli, 2000). I use this measure of success because it shows a direct and insightful way the 
extent to which an actor could move an outcome towards its preferred position.  
The list of gain according the EU actor in table 3 demonstrates that the Commission is 
obviously not capable of translating its means into bargaining success. Only the Netherlands and 
France share a similarly low figure of negotiation success. When looking at table A1 in the 
appendix, we see that the sort of legislative and voting procedure determines only slightly the 
success of the Commission. As expected from the discussion of the formal models on the power 
changes after the codecision procedure, the success of the Commission is smaller in codecision, 
obviously it has to share power with the European Parliament. The form of voting procedure  
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influences the success only to a small extent and rather in the unexpected direction. Voting 
according to qualified majority voting grants the possibility to the Commission to form strategic 
alliances in order to gain necessary coalitions for its proposals, but this does not have an 
influence on the success of the Commission. Another reason for this small difference could be 
the effective consensus norm in the Council which reduces the actual use of qualified majority 
voting to a small number of cases. 
Table 3 Negotiation Success According to Actors20 
EU Actor  Average Gain in 
Negotiation 
Standard deviation  N 
Sweden  72.99  29.02  163 
Finland  72.98  28.24  163 
Austria  70.54  30.97  163 
Denmark  70.06  30.04  163 
Ireland  69.60  29.71  163 
UK  68.11  30.37  163 
Luxembourg  67.72  31.30  163 
Germany   66.31  31.86  163 
Portugal  65.85  31.74  163 
Belgium  65.63  33.09  163 
Greece  65.52  31.96  163 
EP  65.36  35.30  163 
Spain  64.79  33.00  163 
Italy  64.30  33.67  163 
Commission  64.09  34.44  163 
Netherlands  63.69  31.68  163 
France  62.19  32.73  163 
Total  67.04  31.83  2771 
                                                 
 
 
20 These data are partly published in Bailer (2004) which analyses into more detail the success factors for the member states. 
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Obviously the legislative procedures do not matter too much. Another factor which could 
influence the varying influence of this supranational bureaucracy could be the differing qualities 
of the its DGs which have to get informed about possible preferences of the member states or 
current policies in the European Union. Therefore, I will test in the following multivariate 
analysis whether the respective numbers of staff in the responsible DGs influence the success of 
the Commission. In a second model, I will test whether the level of contestation matters and 
decreases the chances for the Commission. The third model shows the effect of procedural 
constraints and a fourth model illustrates the effect of all independent variables.  
Table 4 Influence on the Success of the European Commission 
  DG model  Salience model  Procedure model  Full model 
Staff 2002  0.01*      0.01 
  (0.00)       (0.01) 
Budget 2002  -0.00      -0.00 
  (0.00)      (0.00) 
Length    -0.01***    -0.01** 
    (0.01)    (0.01) 
Salience     -0.02    0.02 
    (0.17)    (0.19) 
QMV       0.05  -0.65 
      (6.00)  (7.09) 
Codecision      -5.72  -5.01 
      (5.73)  (6.35) 
Constant  56.60***  74.25***  67.60***  69.19*** 
  (4.57)  (10.64)  (5.48)  (14.25) 
Observations  150  160  163  147 
Adjusted R-squared  0.02  0.04  -0.01  0.04 
 
Obviously, the number of staff  as well as the length of a proposal have an impact on the success 
of the Commission. The higher the number of staff the more successful the Commission. More 
people in a general-directorate mean more expertise to draft proposals, more ressources to collect 
information about the possible impediments and resistance of the EU governments. The average  
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length of a Commission proposal in days is a proxy for its contestedness and resistance by the 
member states. Alternative measures such as the average salience of the member states and the 
Commission regarding a negotiation topic or the level of disagreement of a proposal have not 
shown a significant effect on the success. The longer a proposal is discussed, the smaller is the 
influence of the Commission. Several proposals such as the takeover directive or the chocolate 
directive where the member states were strongly opposed and either handed the proposal back to 
the Commission or protracted the negotiations considerably, indicate that the Commission’s 
power decreases during the course of negotiations. This proves to some extent Pollack’s claim 
that the Commission’s power decreases when the level of contestation of a proposal increases. 
The legislative procedures do not influence the success of the Commission to a considerable 
extent which might be another indicator that the Commission’s power is not so much present in 
the course of legislative negotiations but only in the early initiation period.  
Apart from these static bureaucratic resources, the legislative procedures or the 
contestation of policy proposals, the behaviour of the Commission - or the respective DGs being 
responsible fort he proposals - might vary and explain the relatively low success of the 
Commission. Some DGs might be more prone to making bold proposals hoping to draw the 
status quo at least a bit towards its desired – more pro-integrationist direction. Other DGs might 
work in policy areas in which they either have no information deficits or have long-standing and 
close working relationships with the EU member states and therefore know where to place their 
proposals and are thus more successful. Table 5 shows the average success and average distance 
of each DG from the median as well as the reference point.  
Table 5 Success, Distance to Reference Point and Median according to DG with more than 8 issues21 
  Success  Distance to 
Reference 
Point 
Distance to 
Median  
n 
DG Education and Culture  75  62.5  23.33  9 
DG Fisheries  69.38  83.33  38.73  13 
DG Agriculture  63.29  47.89  35.7  35 
                                                 
 
 
21 See table A2 in the appendix for the DGs with fewer than 8 issues.  
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DG Health, Consumer Protection  62  58.46  16.57  14 
DG Energy and Transport  58.9  76.11  34.2  10 
DG Internal Market  58.12  79.47  36.5  17 
DG Taxation and Customs Union  49.09  80  41.82  11 
DG Justice and Home Affairs  48  64.29  50.67  15 
Total   64.09  65.95  32.13   
 
 
Table 5 shows distinct differences in gain between the DGs. Whereas traditionally integrated 
policy areas such as Fisheries and Agriculture have high success factors, policy fields such as 
Justice and Home Affairs which are only since recently under Community legislation have 
distinctly lower results. The two DGs treating agriculture and fisheries policy might profit from 
the long-standing experience and the fact that the member states do not contest the competence 
of the Commission in this field anymore. This might be different in the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs in which national ministries and governments still guard their competencies.  
The two measures distance to median and distance to reference point are hardly related 
(Pearson correlation coefficient 0.09). Whereas some DGS seem to make bold proposals 
relatively far away from the status quo such as the DG Fisheries and DG Taxation, they are at 
the same time not very far from the opinion median of the member states as in the DG Fisheries 
and Internal Market. Relatively careful proposals are made by DG Agriculture, Health and 
Consumer Protection, as well as Justice and Home Affairs. DG Justice and Home Affairs also 
shows a very low negotiation success which might be due to not very bold proposals and an 
inability to estimate the opinion median of the member states.  
Table 6 Influence of Distance to Median and Reference point on Success 
   
Distance to Median of EU governments and EP   -0.29*** 
  (0.08) 
Distance to Reference Point  -0.06 
  (0.07) 
Constant  76.20*** 
  (5.88) 
Observations  125  
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Adjusted R-squared  0.10 
 
The regression analysis which tests the influence of these two positional measures on the success 
demonstrates the theoretical considerations that a Commission proposal not too far from the 
status quo and close to the opinion median carries the highest chances of being successful. The 
closer the Commission to the opinion median of the member states (and the EP in case of 
codecision proposals), the higher the success. Similarly, the Commission rather suffers from 
making too bold and extreme suggestions to the member states, because a large distance from the 
status quo diminishes the chances to gain in the negotiations with the EU member states and the 
EP.  
Conclusion 
The analyses presented in this draft are a first analysis of more work to come on the success and 
negotiation of the Commission. In my future research I will continue by looking at further 
specifications of policy areas in order to find out more why the DGs are motivated to make more 
or less extreme proposals and why some DGs are better able to find out the opinion median of 
the member states than others.  
Yet, I can already state after these first analyses that the Commission’s power is to some 
extent overrated. As Hug (2003) correctly pointed out, the Commission is an agent dependent on 
its principals and its preferences are not exogenous but influenced by the EU member states. 
With the analyses above I can demonstrate that the position of the Commission and therefore its 
success are not so much determined by its desire to move the status quo in a pro-integrationist 
direction but by its ability to find out the opinion median of the EU governments. These DGs 
which are able to do this are also more successful.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Negotiation Success of the European Commission according to Procedure  
Gain  Codecision  Consultation   
QMV  61.36 
(78) 
68.97 
(34) 
63.67 
(112) 
Unanimity  63.82 
(23) 
66 
(28) 
65.01 
(51) 
  61.92 
(101) 
67.63 
(62) 
64.09 
(163) 
Figures in Brackets indicate the number of issues. 
 
Table A2:  Success and Distance to Reference Point and Median according to DG, DGs with fewer than 6 
issues 
  Success  n  Distance to 
Reference 
Point 
Distance to 
Median  
DG Enterprise  100  1  100  0 
DG External Relation  93  5  0  1 
DG Environment  85  2  50  0 
DG Enlargement  80  5  100  0 
Industry  77.5  4  40  47.5 
Secretariat-General  75  4  66.66  21.25 
DG Employment, Social Affairs  73.25  4  78.75  13 
DG Industry(old)  72.25  4  50  66.5 
DG External Relations, DG Development  66.5  2  85  31 
DG Budget  50  1  30  30 
DG Budget, DG Education and Culture  50  1  100  0 
Telecommunications, InformationMarket  40  3  73.33  65 
DG Competition  90  3  0  16.67 
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Table A3: Distance of EU Actor to Reference Point 
Member State  Mean Distance to Reference Point  Standard Deviation  n 
EP  67.41  39.59  101 
Commission  65.95  39.16  125 
France  56.42  42.10  125 
Italy  54.77  42.27  121 
Greece  52.42  40.74  112 
Finland  52.13  40.05  117 
Belgium  52.05  41.20  120 
Portugal  50.75  41.73  118 
Denmark  50.34  38.78  118 
Spain  50.26  41.66  125 
UK  50.00  39.25  124 
Ireland  49.41  39.90  115 
Sweden  49.38  39.95  120 
Luxembourg  49.17  40.82  103 
Netherlands  48.45  39.50  122 
Austria  48.11  40.27  104 
Total  52.58  40.74  1995 
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